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Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-No KNOCK

ENTRY HELD REA-

SONABLE IN€ VIRGINIA WHEN EXIGENCIES PRESENT-JOhnSOn v.

Common-

'wealth, 213 Va. 102, 189 S.E.2d 678 (1972).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, an express proclamation of the citizens' indefeasible right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, has now been held fully applicable to state searches and seizures
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' Neither the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution nor any law in Virginia 2 expressly requires those persons performing a search to "announce" 3
their presence, identity, or purpose prior to making their entry for a valid
search. Despite the absence of an express requirement of announcement
before entry, the early common law in England4 and subsequent case law
in the United States5 have indicated that a rule of announcement or notice
was so generally enforced that it was highly probable that the draftsmen of
the fourth amendment felt that it was an implicit requirement for a reasonable search and seizure.6 However, until the recent case of Johnson v. Commonwealth,7 a case of first impression, the Virginia Supreme Court had
never made a determination of whether an unannounced or "no knock"
entry could ever be reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amend-

ment.8
1

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-60 (1961). The Court makes it clear that not
only is the fourth amendment applicable to the states, but that it will be enforced against
the states by means of exclusion, which is the same means of enforcement used against
the federal government.
2The VA. CoNsr. art. 1, § 10 prohibits general warrants, but it does not specifically
deal with manner of entry:
That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to
search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any
person or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly described and
supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.
The VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.1-83 to -89 (Cum. Supp. 1972) contains provisions relating
to search warrants. However, it contains no stipulations concerning entry procedure.
3 See Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L. J. 139, 147 (1970). Announcement is generally construed to mean notice of presence, authority and purpose,
and not just a mere knocking on the door.
4 See, e.g., Seymayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (KJB. 1603), fully discussed note 9 infra.
5 Sonnenreich and Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44 ST. J. L. R1v. 626, 629 (1970). See Oystead v. Shed, 13 Mass. 520 (1816).
0
See Note, Announcement in Police Entries,supra note 3 at 145.
7213 Va. 102, 189 S.E. 2d 678 (1972).
SInsofar as it dealt with 'what is a reasonable search, the determination made by the
Johnson court was properly considered as a judicial matter, taking into account all the
circumstances and basic common law principles. McClannan v. Chaplain, 136 Va. 1,
116 S.E. 495 (1923).
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In Johnson, city police officers armed with a search warrant made a completely unnanounced and forceful entry into the defendant's apartment.
Thereafter, the police found several bags of marijuana, one in the defendant's
possession and others plainly visible in the room. The defendant asserted
the search was unlawful, and that the bag of marijuana were improperly
admitted into evidence because of the failure of the officers to follow the
common law rule of notice before entry.9 After determining the police
had sufficient reason to believe the drugs were present, and that the defendant could have easily disposed of the drugs in a nearby commode upon
announcement, the court held the method of entry was constitutionally reasonable in light of the exigent circumstances.' 0
The modern trend in America, to allow evasion of the notice rule when
certain exigent circumstances are present, has manifested itself in the enact9

The common law rule of notice before entry was first declared in the often cited
Seymayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603), and it has been incorporated by statute
in a large number of states. The case involved an unannounced breaking by the Sheriff
in order to execute a civil writ:
In all cases when the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may
break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the
K.'s process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to
signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors; and that
appears well by the stat. of Westm. 1. c. 17. (which is but an affirmance of the
common law) ...for the law without a default in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking of any house . . . by which great damage and inconvenience
might ensue to the party, . . . for perhaps he did not know of the process, of
which, if he had notice, it is to be presumed that he would obey it ....
d. at
195, 196.
The general enforcement of the Seymayne's rule of announcement was occasionally
excused in a few early cases in the United States, such as in Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166
(1822), where the officers believed someone was in danger of great bodily harm. As
these exceptions to the rule began to appear in the various states, many states passed
statutes to preserve the requirement in Seymayne's Case before it eroded away. See
Sonnenreich and Ebner, supra note 5 at 654-59 for a listing of the states which adopted
the Seymayne's rule by statute and those which adopted it through the common law.
The Johnson court recognized somewhat reluctantly the import of the Seymayne's
rule, but noted that several jurisdictions have formulated various judicial exceptions
to this rule when certain "exigent circumstances" are present. The opinion sets out
these circumstances as follows: "where the facts make it evident that the officer's
purpose is known, or where announcement might frustrate the arrest, increase the peril
of the arresting officer or permit the destuction of evidence." 213 Va. at 104, 189 S.E.2d
at 680.
10 213 Va. at 106, 189 S.E.2d at 681. See also Seymayne's Case, supra note 9; Note,
Announcement in Police Entries, supra note 3, at 140-42, for some of the traditional
reasons given for the rule of notice before entry, including the high regard for privacy
in one's home, the avoidance of the needless violence that may occur if the surprised
dweller resorts to self-help measures to ward off his invaders, and the prevention of
actual physical damage to the dwelling caused by the breaking.
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ment of new statutes allowing no knock entries 1 and in recent case decisions 2 recognizing a limited no knock entry. In light of the practicalities
involved in a narcotics search, such as the disposable nature of the narcotic
substances and the development of indoor plumbing, some relaxation of the
common law rule of announcement has become inevitable.' 3 As a result, it
appears that the general rule has acquired a generally recognized exception
in cases where strict compliance would facilitate the destruction of evidence
and thus frustrate a police officer's purpose.' 4
However, the various cases and statutes that have recognized the destruction of evidence exception along with certain other exceptions have not
concurred as to who is qualified to make the determination that the requisite
exigencies are present. 15 More important, with respect to Johnson, views
have also differed on the required degree of certainty that the person making
the determination should have concerning the actual existence of the exigent
circumstances. 1 It appears that the more strictness and particularity that
is present in the determination of the exigencies, the greater the likelihood
of an entry being termed constitutionally reasonable. Likewise, if a search
"See,

e.g., Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 879 (1970); District of Columbia

Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 (Pub. L. No. 91-358).
12

See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); State v. Mendoza, 104 Ariz. 395,
454 P.2d 140 (1969); People v. De Santiago, 71 Cal.2d 18, 453 P.2d 353, 76 Cal. Rptr.
809 (1969); People v. Rosale, 68 Cal.2d 299, 437 P.2d 489, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968); People
v. Maddox, 46 Cal.2d 301, 294 P.2d 6, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956); People v. Lujan,
484 P.2d 1238 (Colo. 1971); State v. Clarke, 242 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1971); Benefield v.
State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1964); Scull v. State, 122 Ga. App. 696, 178 S.E.2d 720 (1970);
Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 204 A.2d 516 (1964); State v. Linder, 291 Minn. 217,
190 N.W.2d 91 (1971).
13 See Kaplan, Search and Seizure, A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CAUF.
L. REV. 474, 502 (1961). The author of this article questions whether the rule of announcement has any place in modern law despite its historical presence. However, if
one does consider the announcement rule as a fundamental guarantee, the author submits that the allowance of exceptions would have the effect of practically swallowing
up the rule.
145 AM. Jim. 2d Arrests § 93 (1962).
15The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 879 (1970), requires a magistrate to
issue a warrant for all no knock entries. This requirement is reflective of the strong
desire in this country to have an impartial judicial officer make the probable cause
determination in searches and seizures whenever possible. See, e.g., Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). However, the great majority of states that have allowed no knock entries have also allowed the officer conducting the search to determine
if the requisite circumstances are present, whether it be a search with or without
a warrant.
16See Ker v. California, 374 US. 23 (1963), fully discussed note 18 infra, where
those members of the Court who felt the federal constitutional standards of reasonableness were to be followed in state searches, split (4-4) on the degree of objectivity
required by the officer who determines the presence of the exigent circumstances.
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does not exhibit a high degree of specificity and particularity in a determination of exigent circumstances, a no knock entry may risk being termed unreasonable in a judicial inquiry. 17 Ironically, the jurisdiction that led the
no knock movement with a widely cited case, which actually did not show
that the officers had any particular knowledge that the defendants would
destroy the evidence,' 8 has recently held that not only must an officer have
17 If a high degree of particularity is not required in the officer's determination, it
will be based on the officer's beliefs, which in turn may be founded to a great degree
on his general experience in police work and not the facts in his particular case. This
generalized approach amounts to no more than a blanket rule facilitating noncompliance with the notice rule whenever an officer, while acting in good faith on a general assumption, believes that exigent circumstances exist. This blanket approach to
no knock entry was upheld in Justice Clark's opinion (writing for only four members
of the Court concerning this matter) in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-43 (1963).
However, unannounced entry on a blanket basis has been expressly rejected in some
jurisdictions. In People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal.2d 586, 432 P.2d 706, 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10
(1967) the court stated:
Under the Fourth Amendment, a specific showing must always be made to
justify any kind of police action tending to disturb the security of the people
in their homes. Unannounced forcible entry is itself a serious disturbance of
that security and cannot be justified on a blanket basis.
Even if a jurisdiction requires a specific showing of particular facts from which
the exigent circumstances must arise, the question still remains of how specific the
showing must be before it can be'termed reasonable. In People v. Santiago, 71 Cal.2d
18, 453 P.2d 353, 76 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1969), the court stated that if an officer based his
unannounced entry on the fact that the suspect had resorted to trickery to avoid arrest
in an earlier encounter, that this fact alone was not specific enough to warrant the
unannounced entry. In Gastelo, the officer's mere reasonable belief that disposable narcotics were involved was held not to excuse compliance with the notice rule. There
must be an accompanying reasonable belief that the suspect, based on the particular
facts involved, will actually dispose of the narcotics. Therefore, a general propensity
on the part of persons to destroy narcotics when the presence of police is anticipated
is no more than a general assumption, and it does not of itself justify a no knock
entry.
IsKer v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). Since Ker, practically every case in the
United States that has approved of no knock entries based on exigent circumstances
has cited it as supporting authority, and the Jobnson decision is no exception. In Ker,
the Supreme Court was called on to decide if a state search carried out under state
laws must also pass federal constitutional standards of reasonableness. On this point
the court ruled (8-1) that the standards of the fourth amendment as applied through
the fourteenth amendment must not be violated in state searches. Justice Harlan however, felt that state searches should not be judged by the same constitutional standards
that apply to the federal system, but should be iudged by "concepts of fundamental
fairness."
The remaining issue that had to be decided by the Ker Court was whether the actual
no knock entry in question was unreasonable under fourth amendment standard. Of
the eight- justices that felt the fourth amendment was the proper standard, four members, represented by Justice Clark, were content to hold the method of entry reasonable
despite the lack of factual particularity possessed by the entering officers. The other
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sufficient probable cause to even enter one's home, but he also "must have
some particular reason to enter in the manner chosen." 19 In contrast, certain other jurisdictions hold that if an officer merely has sufficient reason
to warrant a search for disposable drugs, then his conclusion that exigent
circumstances are present is valid, even though he has no further factual
basis. 20 Therefore, merely an officer's general experience in drug matters,
not his experience in each factual situation, is required for the no knock
entry.
It is difficult to determine from Johnson exactly what degree of specific
knowledge a Virginia officer must have of the actual circumstances before
he can validly determine that the requisite exigent circumstances are present. Apparently, the Johnson court is content to allow each individual officer
to make this determination based on his own experience in other narcotics
cases and his general knowledge of the defendant's dwelling. 21 It is submitted, therefore, that the Virginia Supreme Court has followed those jurisfour justices, represented by Justice Brennan, felt that the federal requirement of reasonableness in the fourth amendment was violated in this case because the particular
facts were not sufficient to show the requisite circumstances for an unannounced
entry. They felt that in questions of reasonableness under the fourth amendment, the
police have always been required to establish that their action was based on an objective
inquiry into the facts, whether it be done by themselves or by a magistrate. Therefore,
Justice Brennan saw no reason why the police should be allowed to resort to a subjective determination in cases involving possible no knock entries.
The deciding vote in Ker was cast by Justice Harlan who felt the method of entry
was reasonable. However, his standard of reasonableness was completely different from
the other eight justices who were proceeding under the fourth amendment standard.
Therefore, while many cases upholding no knock entries have correctly looked to Ker
as authority supporting the entry when exigent circumstances were present, they have
been incorrect in their assumption that the Supreme Court has ruled that such entries
have been authorized by a blanket rule. See People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal.2d 586, 432 P.2d
706 (1967).
19 Id. at -, 67 Cal. 2d at -, 432 P.2d at 708.
20People v. Lujan, 484 P.2d 1238 (Colo. 1971); State v. Clarke, 242 S.2d 791 (Fla.
1971). In Lujan the court noted that in every case involving a narcotics search, the
police have reasonable cause to believe that the giving of notice would result in a
destruction of the evidence. The Clarke court presented a similar view, but it felt
that there must be evidence of narcotics in small quantities before it would be reasonable for the police to assume it would be destroyed upon their announcement.
2
lJohnson v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 102, 189 S.E.2d 678 (1972). The Johnson court
states that there was "abundant" evidence to establish the existence of the exigent circumstances. However, the only evidence it noted was the officers' experience and
their knowledge that the drugs were dispensed in a kitchen three to four feet from
a bathroom where the evidence "could" be destroyed. The fact that the kitchen was
located next to the bathroom does not appear to be relevant without some particular
evidence that the defendants were inclined to use the bathroom to dispose of the
narcotics.
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dictions" which hold that the presence of probable cause that disposable
narcotics are present in a dwelling equipped with a means of disposing of
the narcotics is an exigency sufficient to warrant an unannounced search.
Moreover, the court seems obviously concerned with the burgeoning drug
traffic problem in Virginia, such that it has decided that the type of no
knock entry set forth in Johnson is necessary if law enforcement officials
are to be effective in dealing with the illegal drug problem. In achieving this
beneficial end, the court has shown itself willing to abrogate some of the
safeguards previously enjoyed by private citizens against unannounced
invasion of their homes.23 Unfortunately, by this approval of the generalized approach to no knock, the citizenry may have lost an excessive degree
of this right to be secure in their homes. It is submitted that a proper balance could be struck by the passage of rational no knock legislation requiring a certain degree of24particularity in the probable cause determination for
an unannounced entry.
R.C.B.

22

See note 20 supra.
The Johnson court did not expressly discuss the balancing of individual rights
against stronger law enforcement, but it was content to limit its discussion in this area
to the general question of reasonableness.
24
See generally Sonnenreich and Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged Constitutional Problem, supra note 5, at 648-53, for a discussion of some new approaches
to no knock.
23

